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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Justin K. Hoskins appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of
methamphetamine, entered upon his conditional guilty plea. On appeal, he challenges the district
court’s denial of his suppression motion.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The district court set forth the facts of this case as follows:
On September 24, 2016, Idaho State Trooper Spencer Knudsen (“Trooper
Knudsen”) stopped a gold Pontiac Grand Am for a cracked windshield. Trooper
Knudsen contacted the occupants of the vehicle and obtained identification from
all of the occupants along with requesting the registration and insurance for the
vehicle. The occupants provided information regarding their identification but
were unable to produce a registration or proof of insurance for the car. Dispatch
informed Trooper Knudsen that the license plates on the vehicle did not return to
a gold Pontiac Grand Am, but rather a blue 1976 Chevrolet Malibu registered to a
Jovette Archuleta, (“Archuleta”) who was the driver of the vehicle.
Trooper Knudsen returned to the vehicle to run the vehicle identification
number (VIN). At that same time he informed Ms. Archuleta that the plates
currently on the car she was driving did not match. Archuleta told Trooper
Knudsen that the plates currently on the vehicle came from her “76 Malibu.”
After providing dispatch with the VIN he asked Archuleta to get out of the car
and talk to him. Trooper Knudsen had Archuleta stand in front of his patrol
vehicle and questioned her as to whether or not there was anything illegal in the
car. The conversation centered on Archuleta’s prior drug conviction and if she
was being honest with him. Archuleta indicated that she did not believe there was
anything illegal in the vehicle. Trooper Knudsen then asked Archuleta if he could
search the car. Archuleta indicated that it was not her car and that [s]he would
have to ask the owner who she indicated was the front seat passenger, Amber
Alvarez (“Alvarez”).
Trooper Knudsen then had Alvarez step out of the vehicle and talk with
him. He then questioned her about the ownership of the car and explained to her
that it was illegal to put license plates on a car that belonged to another vehicle.
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In addition, Trooper Knudsen questioned Alvarez about her prior drug conviction
and whether anything illegal was in the car. Trooper Knudsen then asked for
permission to search the vehicle. Alvarez was reluctant to give consent because
she was concerned that the seller of the vehicle, Winter Tindore (“Tindore”),
would get in trouble if anything illegal was found in the car. Trooper Knudsen
then informed Alvarez that if she wouldn’t give him consent then he would get it
from Archuleta. Alvarez still expressed concern regarding whether Tindore
would get in trouble. Trooper Knudsen then told Alvarez that Tindore would not
be in trouble if illegal items were found in the car. At that point Alvarez gave
Trooper Knudsen consent to search the vehicle.
Once Trooper Knudsen obtained consent to search the car he instructed
the Defendant, Justin K. Hoskins (“the Defendant” or “Hoskins”) to exit the
vehicle. As Hoskins began to exit the car, Trooper Knudsen instructed him to
leave his personal items on the backseat. During the subsequent search of the car
and questioning of the Defendant, Trooper Knudsen found marijuana in a
cigarette package left in the car by the Defendant. Upon closer examination,
Trooper Knudsen discovered a baggie containing methamphetamine.
(R., pp.122-24.)
The state charged Hoskins with possession of methamphetamine, with an enhancement
for being a subsequent drug offense. (R., pp.44-47.) Hoskins filed a motion to suppress the
evidence, arguing that the officer violated his constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures when the officer instructed Hoskins to leave his personal items in the
vehicle. (R., pp.66-67.) Following a hearing on the suppression motion (Tr., pp.8-65), the
district court denied Hoskins’ motion (R., pp.122-30.)
Hoskins entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine, reserving
his right to challenge the denial of his suppression motion. (See R., p.142.) Pursuant to that
guilty plea, the district court entered judgment against Hoskins and sentenced him to a unified
term of three years with one year fixed, suspended that sentence, and placed him on probation for
a period of three years. (R., pp.157-65.) Hoskins timely appealed. (R., pp.166-68.)
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ISSUE
Hoskins states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hoskins’ motion to suppress
evidence?
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Though the district court erred when it concluded that Hoskins lacked standing to
challenge the search of his personal items, it was ultimately correct to deny his suppression
motion. May this Court, applying the correct legal standards to the facts presented below, affirm
the district court’s ultimately correct ruling?
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ARGUMENT
Applying The Correct Legal Standards To The Facts Presented Below, This Court May Affirm
The District Court’s Ultimately Correct Ruling Denying Hoskins’ Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
Hoskins argues that the district court erred when it denied his suppression motion based

on its conclusion that Hoskins lacked standing to challenge the search and seizure of his personal
items. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-12.) Application of the correct legal standards to the facts found
by the district court shows that Hoskins did have standing to challenge the search and seizure of
his personal items, and that the seizure of those items was not justified by the consent exception
to the warrant requirement. However, based on the facts developed below, the seizure of the
methamphetamine was justified under the plain view doctrine, and this Court should affirm the
denial of Hoskins’ suppression motion on that basis. In the alternative, this case should be
remanded for the district court to determine, based on the facts developed below, whether an
exception to the exclusionary rule applies.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a

motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that
are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional
principles to those facts. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.3d 454, 456 (2004).

C.

Hoskins Had Standing To Challenge The Search and Seizure Of His Personal Items
The Fourth Amendment protects against governmental intrusion upon an individual’s

reasonable expectation of privacy. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984). As a
threshold matter, “[a] person challenging a search has the burden of showing he or she had a
4

legitimate expectation of privacy in the item or place to be searched.” State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho
623, 626, 181 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2008). To meet this burden, the moving party must demonstrate
both “a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search” and that “society
[is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.” Id.
The district court determined that Hoskins lacked standing to challenge the search of the
car in which he was a passenger, because he was neither the driver nor an owner of the car. (R.,
pp.129-30.) While the district court was correct as far as it goes, see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 148-49 (1978); State v. Ryan, 117 Idaho 504, 506-07, 788 P.2d 1327, 1329-30 (1990), that
is not dispositive of the standing issue under the circumstances of this case. Hoskins did not
challenge the search of the car; he challenged the search of, what the district court recognized
were, his “personal items.”

(R., pp.66-67, 123.)

Generally, a defendant has standing to

challenge a search of his personal property. See State v. Westlake, 158 Idaho 817, 823, 353 P.3d
438, 444 (Ct. App. 2015).
Had Hoskins voluntarily abandoned his property by simply leaving it behind in the car
when he exited, then he would lack standing to challenge the search. See State v. Harwood, 133
Idaho 50, 52, 981 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Ct. App. 1999). But Hoskins did not abandon his property.
On the contrary, as the district court found, he attempted to remove his personal items from the
vehicle. (R., p.123.) The officer then required him to leave that property behind. (Id.) An
officer may not require a passenger to place his personal property, which he has attempted to
remove, back into a vehicle so that it may become subject to a search of the vehicle. State v.
Newsom, 132 Idaho 698, 700, 979 P.2d 100, 102 (1998). And when abandonment is caused by
unlawful police conduct, that abandonment is not voluntary. Harwood, 133 Idaho at 52, 981
P.2d at 1162.
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Because Hoskins did not voluntarily abandon his personal items, he maintained standing
to challenge the warrantless search and seizure of that property, and the district court erred when
it concluded otherwise.

D.

Ms. Alvarez Lacked Authority To Consent To The Search And Seizure Of Hoskins’
Personal Items
The district court determined that the warrantless search and seizure of Hoskins’ personal

items was valid pursuant to Ms. Alvarez’s free and voluntary consent to search her vehicle. (R.,
pp.126-29.) “Warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).

A search done pursuant to consent is one such well-

established exception to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219
(1973) (citations omitted); State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003).
Freely and voluntarily given consent validates a search. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 222 (citations
omitted).
Though consent to search does not necessarily have to come from the defendant, State v.
Barker, 136 Idaho 728, 730, 40 P.3d 86, 88 (2002), to validly consent to a search, the person
must have some authority, whether actual or apparent, over the item to be searched, State v.
Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 219, 984 P.2d 703, 707 (1999). A third party who “possessed common
authority over or other sufficient relationship to the … effects sought to be inspected” has actual
authority to consent to a search. Barker, 136 Idaho at 730-31, 40 P.3d at 88-89 (citing United
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974)). There is no evidence in the record that Ms. Alvarez
possessed common authority over or had any relationship to Hoskins’ personal items. She
therefore lacked actual authority to consent to a search of that personal property.
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Still, where it is later established that the consenting third party lacked actual authority to
consent, the search may be upheld if the law enforcement officers reasonably believed that actual
authority existed. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990); Brauch, 133 Idaho at 219,
984 P.2d at 707. “The key to the apparent authority exception to the warrant requirement is the
concept of reasonableness.” Brauch, 133 Idaho at 219, 984 P.2d at 707 (citing Rodriguez, 497
U.S. at 183-88). Whether a third party had apparent authority must “be judged against an
objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment ... ‘warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief’ that the consenting party had authority over the premises?”
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)). On appeal,
Hoskins asserts that there was no apparent authority for Ms. Alvarez to consent to a search of
Hoskins’ personal items, which he had gathered and was attempting to remove from the vehicle.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.11-12.) On review of the record before the district court, the state agrees.
The district court appears to have relied upon the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v.
Easterday, 159 Idaho 173, 357 P.3d 1281 (Ct. App. 2015), when determining that the search and
seizure of Hoskins’ personal items fell within the ambit of the search of the vehicle. (See Tr.,
p.57, L. 6 – p.59, L.5.) Any such reliance, however, would be misplaced. When “probable
cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the
vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” Easterday, 159 Idaho at 175,
357 P.3d at 1283 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982)).
While, generally, consent to search a vehicle will also include consent to search containers in
that vehicle, Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991), consent can also be limited and, “when the
basis for a search is consent, the government must conform to the limitations placed upon the
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right granted to search,” State v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151, 154, 106 P.3d 477, 480 (Ct. App. 2004)
(citations omitted).
Because the search of Ms. Alvarez’s vehicle was based on her consent, the officer’s
search had to be limited to the authorized scope of that consent. Because Ms. Alvarez lacked
actual or apparent authority to consent to the search and seizure of Hoskins’ personal items,
which he attempted to remove from the car prior to the search but was prevented from doing so
by law enforcement, Hoskins’ personal items did not fall within the scope of Ms. Alvarez’s
consent. The warrantless search and seizure of Hoskins’ personal items, therefore, was not
lawful under this exception to the Fourth Amendment.

E.

The Discovery Of Hoskins’ Methamphetamine Was Independently Justified Under The
Plain View Doctrine
Though the district court erroneously determined that Hoskins lacked standing to

challenge the search of his personal items based on Ms. Alvarez’s consent to search her vehicle,
this Court may still affirm the district court’s ultimately correct ruling by applying the correct
legal standards. Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 579, 21 P.3d 895, 901 (2001). The state did not
argue below that the search and seizure of Hoskins’ personal items was justified by anything
other than Ms. Alvarez’s consent to search her vehicle (see R., pp.98-113), and the state
acknowledges that, if not justified by another exception, the search of Hoskins’ personal items
would be a violation of the Fourth Amendment. But that does not end the inquiry. The evidence
that Hoskins sought to suppress in this case, the baggie of methamphetamine, was not discovered
incident to the consent-justified search of Ms. Alvarez’s vehicle; rather, it was found during an
independent search of Hoskins’ cigarette pack.
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During the hearing on Hoskins’ suppression motion, 1 the officer testified that he asked
Hoskins to leave his wallet and cigarette pack in the car as Hoskins exited the vehicle. (Tr., p.20,
L.24 – p.21, L.8.) The officer explained that, “[t]hrough [his] training and experience, people are
known to carry knives and weapons and drugs some times [sic] inside those containers, and for
[his] safety, [he] asked [Hoskins] to place those things back in the vehicle after he exited the
vehicle.” (Tr., p.21, Ls.9-13.) The officer did not immediately search those items, however.
Instead, after patting Hoskins down and removing a pocketknife from his person, the officer
asked him “if there was anything illegal in the vehicle.” (Tr., p.21, L.13 – p.22, L.20.) Hoskins
eventually admitted that he had marijuana in his cigarette pack. (Tr., p.22, L.20 – p.23, L.5.)
The officer retrieved the cigarette pack and opened it to confirm that it contained marijuana.
(Tr., p.23, Ls.13-22.) The officer then proceeded with his search of the vehicle, which yielded
no evidence. (Tr., p.24, Ls.1-8.) After he completed that search, intending to confiscate the
marijuana and return Hoskins’ cigarette pack with a citation, the officer removed the marijuana
and, at that point, discovered the baggie of methamphetamine. (Tr., p.24, L.9 – p.25, L.23.)
There can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in what a person knowingly exposes to
the public. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). As the Court of Appeals has
previously recognized, “a defendant’s disclosure of the contents of a package has a practical
effect similar to placing the contents in plain view, thereby reducing the defendant’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in the container.” State v. Dreier, 139 Idaho 246, 252, 76 P.3d 990, 996
(Ct. App. 2003) (citing United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 874 (2d Cir. 1981); United States
1

The state here relies upon the evidence presented before the district court and not the court’s
limited factual findings. While the court’s findings are consistent with this evidence, the state
recognizes that they are not fully developed. (See R., pp.123-24.) If this Court cannot directly
affirm the district court on the correct legal analysis presented herein due to the court’s limited
factual findings, then the state asks that this case be remanded for the district court to complete
its findings based on the evidence already presented.
9

v. Candella, 469 F.2d 173, 175 (2d Cir. 1972)). Thus, once Hoskins admitted that his cigarette
pack contained marijuana, he relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy in that
immediately apparent contraband, and the officer was justified in opening the container and
seizing the marijuana. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76 (1993) (citing Horton
v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990)). Once the officer properly removed the marijuana,
Hoskins’ baggie of methamphetamine was exposed to plain view, and the officer was justified in
seizing that as well. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1971). There was,
therefore, no Fourth Amendment violation associated with the discovery of Hoskins’ baggie of
methamphetamine, and the district court correctly denied Hoskins’ suppression motion.
Moreover, even if there were some illegality associated with the consent-justified search
of Ms. Alvarez’s vehicle, Hoskins’ unrelated admission that there was marijuana in the cigarette
pack would still make suppression inappropriate.

The United States Supreme Court has

explained that, while the exclusionary rule applies to evidence acquired as a result of a Fourth
Amendment violation, “exclusion may not be premised on the mere fact that a constitutional
violation was a ‘but-for’ cause of obtaining evidence.” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592
(2006). Evidence is not “fruit of the poisonous tree simply because it would not have come to
light but for the illegal actions of police.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88
(1963). Rather, the question is whether police obtained the evidence “by exploitation of that
illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Id.
at 488 (quotation omitted).
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized at least three exceptions to the exclusionary
rule, including the independent source, inevitable discovery, and attenuated basis doctrines.
State v. Stuart, 136 Idaho 490, 496-98, 36 P.3d 1278, 1284-86 (2001). If this Court cannot
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directly affirm the district court on the correct legal analysis presented above, then this case
should be remanded to the district court to determine, based on the facts already developed
before it, whether one of these exceptions to the exclusionary rule applies.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s decision on
Hoskins’ suppression motion and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 14th day of March, 2018.

/s/ Russell J. Spencer________________________
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
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Deputy Attorney General
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